Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act by Foster, Henry H. & Freed, Doris Jonas
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 28 | Issue 4 Article 5
1-1977
Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Henry H. Foster
Doris Jonas Freed
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Henry H. Foster and Doris Jonas Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28
Hastings L.J. 1011 (1977).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol28/iss4/5
Child Snatching and Custodial Fights:
The Case for the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act
By HENRY H. FOSTER* and DORIS JONAS FREED**
Introduction
The maturity of a legal system may be judged in part by the way it
has provided alternatives to self-help. The blood feud, lex talionis,
composition, and the law of libel and slander, are familiar examples of
such options.' Matrimonial actions may be regarded as substitutes for
what has been called "Divorce Italian Style."'2  But our law as to child
custody remains barbaric. To the possessor belong the spoils.
A few years ago the editor of the Saturday Evening Post wrote to
the president of the American Bar Association to report a conversation
he had overheard regarding a contested custody case. The editor wrote
that he heard a lawyer advise his client to seize his child and flee to
another state where the courts would be more favorable to his side of the
case. "Can this be true," asked the editor, "is there no law to preclude
kidnapping by a parent?" The answer, of course, is that under the
existing law of most states and countries, child-snatching by a parent
usually is condoned, often rewarded, and rarely punished.3 Moreover,
federal authorities and the Constitution to date have displayed a "hands
off" attitude.
* Professor of Law, New York University.
** Member of the New York and Maryland Bars.
1. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 3-4 (1881).
2. It should be noted that since the film Divorce Italian Style Italy has enacted
a divorce law. The successor of Justin the Second repealed an ordinance of Justinian
decreed in 542 A.D. which forbade divorce even by mutual consent and justified his
action on the ground that indissoluble marriage was an incitement to murder. M. RADIN,
HANDBOOK OF RoMAN LAW 117 (1927).
3. See, e.g., Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866, 154 N.Y.S.2d
903 (1956). See also Ferguson v. State, 251 Ala. 645, 38 So. 2d 853 (1949); Rethorst
v. Rethorst, 214 Md. 1, 133 A.2d 101 (1957); Casteel v. Casteel, 45 N.J. Super. 338,
132 A.2d 529 (1957).
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The law remains unchanged despite sensational cases such as those
involving "Baby Lenore"4 and the Mellon family.5  The egregious
inadequacy of the law and the success of self-help have been exposed to
full public view and well may have added to public cynicism regarding
our system of justice. A recent issue of The Wall Street Journal6 reports
the activities of one Eugene Austin of Foley, Missouri, who runs a
heating and airconditioning business and moonlights as a child-snatcher
in custody cases. Mr. Austin is reputed to have completed more than
two hundred snatches, most of them for fathers, and has run into legal
difficulties only once in his career.7  According to the account, Mr.
Austin is widely known as "Mean Gene," and his professed goal is to
reform child custody laws.8
With friends like that, family law reformers should be spared
enemies. And yet, surprisingly, no great impetus has come from the
organized bar for the elimination of predatory practices in custody cases.
This article will deal with the existing law and proposals for its reform.
The Legal Problem
Although the full faith and credit clause9 of the Constitution
4. Baby Lenore was held for adoption by her mother soon after birth in May,
1970. The baby was placed with a family but before an adoption order was entered
the natural mother apparently changed her mind and eventually brought a habeas corpus
action to reclaim her child from the responsible adoption agency. The adopting family's
attempt to intervene in that proceeding was disallowed and the mother's action to re-
cover the baby was successful both in the lower court and on appeal. People ex rel.
Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y. 2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.
2d 65 (1971). The adoptive parents subsequently moved to Florida before any order
was served upon them; the natural mother brought another habeas corpus action in Flor-
ida. In the second proceeding, however, the Florida court denied full faith and credit
to the New York decision and subsequently awarded custody to the adoptive parents.
For a full discussion of the Baby Lenore case, see Foster, Adoption and Child Custody:
Best Interest of the Child?, 22 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 7-14 (1972).
5. The Mellon children were apparently the victims of two parental abductions.
Mrs. Karen Boyd Mellon took her two children from Pennsylvania to New York ap-
proximately a year and a half after custody had been awarded to her husband by a Penn-
sylvania court in April of 1974. In March 1976, after Mrs. Mellon had won custody
of the children from a New York court, Mr. Mellon took the children from their body-
guard and returned them to Pennsylvania through an elaborate scheme involving private
airplanes and armed agents. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 7.
6. See Huey, To Man Whose Job is Child-Snatching, End Justifies Means, Wall
St. Journal, Mar. 24, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
7. Id. at 19, cols. 1-3. Mr. Austin was extradited from Missouri on a charge of
child torture and was convicted on one count of aggravated assault and sentenced to
thirty months in jail and thirty months on probation by the Miami, Florida court. He
is now free on appeal, a $7,500 bond having been posted by a divorced men's group.
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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mandates interstate recognition of sister state decrees,'" and has no
proviso limiting its operation to "final" decrees, a condition of finality
has nonetheless been judicially imposed." Decrees and orders relating
to child custody and visitation (and also child support) are invariably
subject to modification owing to a change of circumstances and hence
are nonfinal in that sense. Moreover, since the first forum may modify,
it is permissible for a second forum to do so without violating any full
faith and credit obligation.' 2
The unfortunate results of these principles of full faith and credit in
the custody area were marked some years ago by the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Rutledge in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Helvey.' 3 He
pointed out that the lack of constitutional obligation to recognize prior
custody decrees makes possible a continuing round of litigation over
custody, perhaps also of abduction, with consequences that "hardly can
be thought conducive to the child's welfare."' 4 He further said that the
effect of such a rule "may be to set up an unseemly litigious competition
between the states and their respective courts as well as between par-
ents," and that somehow "there should be an end to litigation in such
matters."' 15
Mr. Justice Rutledge's realistic appraisal of the results of withhold-
ing full faith and credit from custody decrees has been confirmed by
subsequent experience. New York will give some res judicata effect
to the prior determination of facts bearing on child custody,16 but
for all practical purposes a de novo determination will be made when
modification is sought. The leading cases of Bachman v. Mejias 7 and
Berlin v. Berlin'" illustrate that the New York courts usually feel unre-
strained by prior adjudications of custody. The Supreme Court has
accommodated its decisions to the New York views' 9 and Mr. Justice
10. See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86 (1944) (Jackson, I., concurring).
11. See Foster & Freed, Modification, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Ahinony Orders, 11 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 280 (1975).
12. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 325
(1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
13. 330 U.S. 610, 619 (1947).
14. Id. at 619-20.
15. Id.
16. See H. FOSTER & D. FREED, LAW AND THE FAMILy-NEw YORK § 29:35
(1966).
17. 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956).
18. 21 N.Y.2d 371, 235 N.E.2d 109, 288 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1967); cf. Berlin v. Berlin,
239 Md. 52, 210 A.2d 380 (1965).
19. See CLARK, supra note 12, at 323-26.
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Frankfurter in a series of decisions ended up adopting the position that
the full faith and credit clause had no application to custody cases.20
Fortunately, New York occasionally has exercised some self-re-
straint in interstate custody disputes. There are decisions applying
estoppel or the "clean hands" doctrine against a party who has wrongful-
ly taken children from their proper or legal custodian and then sought a
New York change of custody or visitation rights.2 ' In addition, at least
one recent decision on the trial level deferred to jurisdiction of an
English court because it had better access to all the data bearing on the
custody issue.22 This example of forum non conveniens, however, is
not typical of New York cases and depended upon the unusual facts of
the case.28
It should be noted that so far we have been discussing the typical
child-snatching case. We are not concerned with an exercise of emer-
gency jurisdiction to intervene and stop child abuse or to protect a
"battered child." Of course, it is appropriate to intervene where the life
or health of a child is seriously threatened,24 and such an exercise of
parens patriae power is undisputed. Indeed, a failure to act may be
regarded as irresponsible.25
It is probably fortuitous that the two states which most often have
shown disdain for prior custody decisions are Florida and New York. In
Florida, there is a literal de novo trial of custodial rights without
reference to prior decrees of sister states.26 New York is not quite so
parochial but usually its courts are adept at finding a change of circum-
stances so as to justify a new order. 7 Other states appear to be more
apt to defer to the original forum or to impose the clean hands doc-
trine.28
20. See the opinions by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S.
604, 613 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953).
21. See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REV.
345, 357-69 (1953). The leading New York case is Lang v. Lang, 7 N.Y.2d 1029, 166
N.E.2d 861, 200 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1960).
22. Turner v. Ratnoff, 78 Misc. 2d 878, 358 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
23. The New York court deferred to the High Court of Justice of England which
had assumed custody jurisdiction over the child and had made her a ward of the court
and had appointed the official solicitor as guardian. Id.
24. See Ferreira v. Ferreira, 9 Cal. 3d 824, 512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80
(1973).
25. Id.
26. See Scarpetta v. DeMartino, 254 So. 2d 813 (Fla. App. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
27. See H. FosTR & D. FREED, LAW AND THE FAMILY-NEw YORK § 29:35
(1966).
28. See note 21 supra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
March 1977] CHILD SNATCHING AND CUSTODIAL FIGHTS 1015
To date the suggestions as to remedies for the child-snatching
problem have been (1) judicial self-restraint in entertaining modifica-
tion proceedings,29 (2) congressional action to amend the Judiciary Act
so that the full faith and credit obligation is expressly made to adhere to
custody and visitation decrees and orders,3" (3) the imposition of
criminal sanctions against those who wrongfully or illegally take or
retain children in violation of the rights of the lawful custodian, and (4)
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. In this article we will
discuss the third and fourth suggestions at some length.
Expansion of Kidnapping Statutes
At common law kidnapping was a misdemeanor punishable by
fine, imprisonment, and pillory.31 Under modem statutes it is a felony,
and frequently kidnapping for ransom has been made a capital of-
fense. 32 In some states abduction of a child is included within the
purview of a kidnapping statute.3 3  In most states, however, either child
abduction is not expressly covered or there are separate "child-stealing"
statutes which vary in form and coverage.
Child-stealing statutes require that the child be abducted by force,
persuasion, or enticement, and often prescribe a given age for the
child.34 In the absence of any custodial decree, a parent taking or
29. See Levicky v. Levicky, 49 N.J. Super. 562, 140 A.2d 534 (1958); Brazy v.
Brazy, 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.2d 738 (1958); Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance
Law Across State Lines, 10 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 819, 831 (1944).
30. See Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress,
Sup. CT. REV. 89, 109-18 (1964). The policy expressed in the Uniform Act was ori-
ginally advanced by Professor Leonard Ratner. See Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal
System, 62 MicH. L. REv. 795 (1964); Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate
Child Custody Problem: A Reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38
S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1965).
31. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 180 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
PERKINS].
32. Id. See also Lindbergh Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-02 (1970 & Supp.
V, 1975); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1970) (kidnapping during bank robbery).
33. PERKINS, supra note 31, at 181. However, N.Y. PEN. LAW § 135.30 (McKin-
ney 1975) expressly makes it an affirmative defense to a kidnapping charge that the
defendant was a relative of the person abducted and his sole purpose was to assume con-
trol of the person. Another statute makes "custodial interference" a class A mnisdemean-
or. Id. § 135.45. But if the child's safety or health are endangered the abduction is
made a class E felony. Id. § 135.50. The sentence for a class A misdemeanor may
not exceed one year. Id. § 70.15. The sentence for a class E felony may not exceed
four years. Id. § 70.00. To be guilty of custodial interference the one who takes or
entices the child from the legal custodian must know "that he has no legal right to do
so." Id. § 135.45.
34. PERKINS, supra note 31, at 181.
retaining his child does not violate most child-stealing statutes. 5 Such
has been held even though the taking or retention violated an agree-
ment36 or occurred while a custodial decree was pending.37 Moreover,
a third person helping a parent appears to be entitled to the same
defense. 38
Where a wrongful taking or retention occurs after a valid custody
order or decree, a few cases have held that such wrongful conduct
constitutes kidnapping or child-stealing,39 although prosecutors may be
loath to prosecute and courts or juries slow to convict. The severity of
the penalty weakens its efficacy. The draftsmen of the Model Penal
Code refused to include ordinary child-snatching within its provisions
regarding kidnapping and abduction; 40 under the Code's terms a claim
to legal right of custody constitutes a complete defense, even though the
taking or retention was in violation of a court order.4'
The practical result is that under the criminal law of most states
child-snatching is not prosecuted. Moreover, police and prosecutors
usually are uncooperative, viewing a custody dispute as one example of
a family fight that had best be avoided. This "hands off" attitude also
has been shared by the FBI, which reputedly has ignored appeals for aid




37. Id. at 182. See generally New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610
(1947).
38. See State v. Dewey, 155 Iowa 469, 136 N.W. 533 (1912).
39. E.g., Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 127 P. 1023 (1912). However, a parent
taking the child before any custody decree has been held not to be guilty of kidnapping.
See People v. Spiers, 17 Cal. App. 2d 477, 62 P.2d 414 (1936); People v. Nelson, 322
Mich. 262, 33 N.W.2d 786 (1948).
40. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 212.1, .4 (1962) (kidnapping and interference
with custody respectively).
41. To be guilty of interfering with custody, the defendant must have "knowingly
or recklessly" taken or enticed the child from the lawful custodian "when he has no pri-
vilege to do so." Id. § 212.4. It is an affirmative defense that he "believed that his
action was necessary to preserve the child from danger to its welfare." Id. The reporter
rejected Professor Foster's suggestions that teeth be put into this provision in order to
deter child-snatching and encourage police cooperation.
42. In a letter to a California parent, Richard L. Thornburgh, United States Assis-
tant Attorney General, Criminal Division, explained the FBI's position: "[W]ithout
clear evidence that [the abducting parent] has absented himself from California to
avoid prosecution and that by reason of his mental condition or otherwise he presents
a substantial threat of physical injury to [the abducted child], Federal intervention
here would be inappropriate." Letter from Richard L. Thornburgh to Mrs. Shirley Ryan,
Aug. 15, 1975 (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
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Bills were introduced in the last session of Congress to extend
federal and FBI authority to child-snatching cases.43 In substance,
the proposed amendment to the Lindberg Act44 would have authorized
imprisonment for up to ofte year and a $1,000 fine, or both, where a
person is convicted of interstate child-snatching in violation of a court
order or decree." The importance of this proposed legislation is not
that it might be a deterrent to child-snatching as such but that it would
confer clear authority for FBI investigation in such cases and would
facilitate the tracing of abducted children. Such legislation also might
be of assistance in international custody disputes whero a child is
illegally taken out of the United States or is retained abroad in violation
of a court order.
California has recently passed legislation 6 supplementing the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 47 and specifically dealing with
child abduction by parents in violation of custody decrees. The legisla-
tion provides that anyone who, without a right to custody, abducts a
minor child "with intent to detain or conceal such child from a parent,
guardian, or other person having the lawful charge of such child" may
be fined up to $10,000 and imprisoned up to ten years."' Custody
violation by the parent having custody rights is also covered. The
legislation provides that a custodian who detains or conceals a child
from another person with visitation or partial custody rights under a
decree will also be punished by imprisonment for up to a year and a fine
of up to $1,000.49 Enforcement of these provisions is ensured by a
mandate that "the district attorney shall take all actions necessary" to
locate those who violate custody decrees or orders to appear before the
court for adjudication of custody.50 This new legislation should provide
some assistance for California courts attempting to protect children from
the extralegal hazards of custody disputes and should reduce the possi-
bility that desperate parents will take the law into their own hands. The
need for similar legislation elsewhere, however, remains acute.
43. See Hearings on H.R. 4191 and H.R. 8722 Before the Subcomm. on Crime
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 38 (1974).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-02 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
45. See H.R. 4486, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced by Representative
Bennett).
46. Cal. Stat. 1976, ch. 1399.
47. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-58 (West Supp. 1976).
48. Cal. Stat. 1976, ch. 1399, § 10.
49. Id. § 10.5.
50. Id. § 3.
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As in the past, criminal sanctions have but limited application to
the overall problem. For example, self-help before a court has acted
may be unethical but not illegal. Before a court order has been handed
down, parents may have an equal legal right to custody, as is true under
New York law.5 Even if the court order or decree is violated, prosecu-
tion and conviction may be extremely unlikely, and states have been
known to refuse extradition of a fugitive parent. As in the case of
interstate child support collection, cooperation between states in civil
proceedings may be more practicable.12
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
In 1968 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
which then was approved by the American Bar Association. 53 Profes-
sor Foster was an adviser and participated in the drafting of the statute.
Unfortunately, to date the Uniform Act has been enacted in only eight
states (California,5" Colorado,55 Hawaii,"0 Maryland,5 7 Michigan,"8
North Dakota,59 Oregon,6 ° and Wyoming61), although it is pending
before the legislatures of several states, including the current session in
New York.62
The basic purposes of the Uniform Act are to discourage continued
controversies over child custody in the interest of stability of home
environment for the child, to deter child abductions and similar prac-
tices, and to promote interstate assistance in adjudicating custody mat-
ters.63 The basic scheme is to designate one court as the proper forum
for determining custody initially or for seeking modification and to
51. See N.Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW §§ 70, 240 (McKinney 1964 & Supp.
1976).
52. Cf. id. §§ 30-43.
53. For a full discussion of the Uniform Act see Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict
of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1969).
54. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-74 (West Supp. 1976).
55. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-13-101 to -126 (1974).
56. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26 (Supp. 1975).
57. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 184-207 (1976).
58. MICH. COMp. LAWS. ANN. §§ 600.651-.675 (1976).
59. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1971).
60. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 109.700-.930 (Supp. 1975).
61. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-143 to -167 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
62. S. 7075. The bill, introduced by Senator Pisani, would enact the Uniform Act
as article 5-A of the domestic relations law.
63. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 1.
[Vol. 28
March 1977] CHILD SNATCHING AND CUSTODIAL FIGHTS 1019
channel to that court relevant data from other places. Other states are
supposed to cooperate but not to compete with the proper forum on
custodial matters.
The proper forum to determine custody in most instances is the so-
called "home state" of the child, on the assumption that it is in the best
position to gather evidence and to have a continuity of control. "Home
state" is defined as "the state in which the child immediately preceding
the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or person acting as
parent, for at least six consecutive months. ... "64 Where the child is
less than six months old, the home state is "the state in which the child
lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned."6 ' Periods of
temporary absence from the state are counted as part of the six month
period, and if a child is removed from or retained out of his home state
it nonetheless retains full custody jurisdiction for a six month period
thereafter.0 6 As long as the home state has jurisdiction under the
Uniform Act, other states defer to and cooperate with that jurisdiction.
This concept of continuing jurisdiction in the home state over child
custody and visitation is consistent with conflict of laws theory regarding
jurisdiction, 7 and deference to that authority by other states reflects a
policy of forum non conveniens68 which is compulsory for those states
which enact the Uniform Act. An analogy also may be made to
long-arm statutes in that the home state nexus is the basis for adjudicat-
ing custodial status even if the child has been removed or retained out of
state. 9
64. Id. § 2(5).
65. id.
66. Id. § 3(a)(1).
67. See generally Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913).
68. But see N.Y. Civ. PnAc. LAw § 327 (McKinney Supp. 1976). "When the court
finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another
forum, the court, on the motion of any party, may stay or dismiss the action in whole
or in part on any conditions that may be just. The domicle or residence in this state
of any party to the action shall not preclude the court from staying or dismissing the
action." Id. (emphasis added).
69. See id. § 302 (b), which provides: "A court in any matirmonial action or
family court proceeding involving a demand for support or alimony may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over the respondent or defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or
she no longer is a resident or domiciliary of this state, or over his or her executor or
administrator, if the party seeking support is a resident of or domiciled in this state at
the time such demand is made, provided that this state was the matrimonial domicile
of the parties before their separation, or the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this
state, or the obligation to pay support or alimony accrued under the laws of this state
or under an agreement executed in this state."
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The Uniform Act thus would apply in situations where New York
was the home state"° and a parent or custodian flees with the child to
another state before or during custodial proceedings. The act would
also apply to a child who was temporarily out of the state visiting some-
one who refused to return him to New York. If the state where the child
was physically present has enacted the Uniform Act, it would defer to
New York's jurisdiction and decline to entertain custody proceedings; if
already commenced, such proceedings would be stayed unless New
York in turn held that the second state was a more appropriate forum,"1
in which event the second state could determine custodial rights. The
Uniform Act expressly states that although physical presence of the
child is desirable for an exercise of custody jurisdiction,7 2 it is not a
prerequisite thereto except in emergency situations, such as where the
child has been abandoned or abused, or otherwise neglected.72
In addition to the usual home state basis for custody jurisdiction,
the act has a catch-all provision which applies where it is in the best
interst of the child to assume jurisdiction. The best interest requirement
would be met where the child and at least one contestant have a
significant connection with the forum and where substantial evidence
concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships is present in that forum. In rare instances jurisdiction of a second
state could supersede that of the technical home state because of the
legitimacy of the second state's concern and superior access to relevant
evidence.
There are two other possible bases for custody jurisdiction in the
Uniform Act, but they will have minimal application. First, the forum
state may exercise jurisdiction in emergency situations where the child is
physically present within the state and has been abandoned, mistreated,
abused, neglected, or has been threatened with such treatment.74  Sec-
ond, jurisdiction may be exercised if it appears that no other state would
have jurisdiction under any of the other three bases, 5 or if it appears
that another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
a second state is the more appropriate forum, and if it would be in the
best interest of the child to assume jurisdiction, then the second state
70. See note 64 supra.
71. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 7.
72. Id. § 3(c).
73. Id. § 3(a)(3).
74. Id.
75. Id. §§ 3(a)(1)-(3).
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may proceed even though it does not qualify as a home state.70  Such
exceptional circumstances should be rare.
The act's provisions concerning jurisdiction are in accord with
prevailing theories of child development and the psychological best
interests of children.77  There is a consensus among experts on child
development that stability, continuity, and security of the parent-child
relationship is of utmost importance, although the damage caused by
disruption may differ in degree depending upon the age of the child and
the kinds of environment. 78  The home state requirement for custodial
jurisdiction backs up the experience and insights of behavioral scientists,
and since the act prevents or inhibits child-snatching it protects the
stability of ongoing relationships.
There is, however, a possible legal issue regarding the jurisdictional
provisions. In May v. Anderson, 71 Mr. Justice Burton in a plurality
opinion compared custodial rights with personal property rights and
insisted that the other party was not bound by an ex parte divorce and
award of custody, at least where the absent party was the mother
living in another state. The opinion, which has been roundly cri-
ticized,80 intimates that custody, like alimony or support, is an inci-
dent of marital status that cannot, for full faith and credit purposes, be
cut off without personal jurisdiction over the affected party. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, however, was careful to point out that although full faith
and credit to the ex parte decree was not obligatory, nonetheless comity
might be accorded to it.81
We are thus faced with the possibility that May v. Anderson may
be read as constitutional doctrine making personal jurisdiction over a
party claiming custody a sine qua non because custodial rights are
equated with property rights and because due process requires in per-
sonam jurisdiction for their termination. The practical consequences of
such a rationale are that parental rights are given priority over the best
76. Id. § 3(a)(4).
77. See CLARK, supra note 12, at 326; A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 197
(1968); Bodenheiner, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative
Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1209
(1969).
78. See Modlin, Statement, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHUTRY 319-22 (R. Allen,
E. Fester, & J. Rubin eds. 1968); Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced
Parents, 10 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 807, 812-14 (1944).
79. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
80. See, e.g., Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA.
L. REv. 379 (1959).
81. 345 U.S. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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interests of children and the traditional parens patriae powers of the
states. Moreover, it may be doubted that Mr. Justice Burton's plurality
opinion would be applied to the situation where it was the lather who
had left the home state and the mother obtained a divorce with a
custody order, even though theoretically his parental rights were cut off
without personal jurisdiction over him.
In order to insulate the custody decrees of the home state from
such constitutional objections, the Uniform Act ensures procedural due
process for claimants to custody. Reasonable notice and an opportunity
to be heard must be given to any parent whose parental rights have not
been previously terminated and to any person who has physical custody
of the child.82 If such a person cannot be personally served within the
home state adequate provisions are made for service outside the state.8
In addition, if it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate
forum it may require that party who commenced the proceedings to pay
court costs and "necessary travel and other expenses, including attorn-
eys' fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses."84
The latter provision has two major purposes. First, it will offset to
some degree the economic disadvantage of a party, most often the
mother, who cannot afford to contest custody in another state. Second,
it should discourage self-help because the party who resorts to that
practice may be subjected to all of the costs of a modification proceed-
ing. Although this technique is innovative it is singularly appropriate
for child custody disputes.
With regard to the jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform Act it is
important to note that they apply to both the original proceeding and to
proceedings for modification of a prior order. It is also important that a
court has custody jurisdiction only if at least one of the previously
discussed bases is present. In other words, except in emergency cases of
child abandonment or abuse, dependency or neglect, there is usually
only one appropriate forum, and ordinarily that is the home state.
Where a person having lawful custody moves with the child to another
state or country the new home eventually may become the home state,
superseding the former one. This scheme raises some difficult prob-
lems.
First, for those states enacting the Uniform Act, jurisdiction to
grant a divorce and to award custody may not be coterminous. Divorce
82. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 4.
83. Id. § 5.
84. Id. § 7(g). See also id. § 19(b).
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jurisdiction traditionally exists at the domicile of one party. That domi-
cile may or may not be the home state contemplated by the Uniform
Act. Moreover, the pragmatic consequence of the Supreme Court's
decisions applying full faith and credit principles to divorce jurisdic-
tion8 5 is that personal jurisdiction over both parties is a basis for
granting a divorce even in the absence of any domicile. The result is
the same whether expressed in terms of jurisdiction or res judicata and
collateral estoppel. But under the Uniform Act such personal jurisdic-
tion over the marital partners is not in itself an appropriate basis for an
award of custody. This means that custody may not be adjudicated by
the divorce forum which is not a home state and that custodial and
visitation rights may have to be determined in subsequent proceedings at
the appropriate forum.
On this issue, however, the provisions of the Uniform Act do not
make the situation appreciably worse than it was under the usual rules.
May v. Anderson had already created the problem because it defined the
right to child custody as a "divisible incident" of divorce."" Under
existing law divorce and custody jurisdiction are not always coterminous
even though an order as to custody and visitation often accompanies
divorce. More important, it may be argued that it does not comport
with public policy to permit a "quickie" divorce state to adjudicate the
custody issue for unrepresented children.8 7
The other problem regarding the custody jurisdiction of successive
home states is that of cooperation between such states. A number of
sections of the Uniform Act address this problem. A major section
provides that even a second home state shall not modify a prior custody
decree unless the original forum no longer has or declines to exercise
jurisdiction under the Uniform Act; the second state must request copies
of and give due consideration "to the transcript of the record and other
documents of all previous proceedings submitted to it" in accordance
with the Uniform Act.8 8  The original home state is obligated to pre-
serve the transcript and other documents and upon appropriate request
to forward them to the second state.
85. See generally Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Foster, Recognition of
Migratory Divorces: Rosenstiel v. Section 250, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 429 (1968).
86. See 345 U.S. 528, 534 n.6 (1953). See also Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
416 (1957); Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1233 (1963).
87. For a disscussion of a child's right to counsel in divorce proceedings, see Note,
A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27 HAsT. L.J.
917 (1976).
88. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 14.
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Other sections of the Uniform Act provide for the recognition and
enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees, whether initial decrees or
modifications, if the other state assumed jurisdiction under statutory pro-
visions substantially in accordance with the Uniform Act." ' A registry
of out-of-state custody decrees is to be maintained in those states which
adopt the Uniform Act, including certified copies of decrees and orders,
any communications regarding the pendency of custodial proceedings,
findings as to inconvenient forums, and other matters affecting an
assumption of custody jurisdiction."0 Before entertaining jurisdiction to
modify a prior custody order, a state which has adopted the Uniform Act
must consult the registry to determine whether any proceeding is pending
in another state.91 Finally, when a certified copy of the custody decree of
another state is filed with the clerk of the supreme court or the family
courts it "shall be enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered
by a court of this State."'9 2 A person violating a custody decree of
another state, thereby making it necessary to enforce the decree locally,
may be required to pay necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorney fees, incurred by witnesses of the party entitled to custody. q
Still other provisions of the Uniform Act cover the situation where
a custody proceeding is brought at an inconvenient forum or at the
original forum after it no longer is a convenient forum. 4 For a
determination of inconvenience several factors are set forth: whether
or not it is in the best interests of the child to have another state assume
jurisdiction; whether another state is or recently was the home state, or
has a closer connection with the child and family; the availability of
relevant evidence; and whether an assumption or refusal of jurisdiction
would further the purposes of the Uniform Act. Before making such a
determination there must be communication and an exchange of infor-
mation between states. The court may decline to exercise jurisdiction or
stay its proceedings as circumstances warrant.
In recent legislation95 California has expanded the concepts of
cooperation and communication between states. Under California's
amendments to the Uniform Act a court declining to exercise jurisdic-
tion upon a petition for an initial custody proceeding must notify the
89. See id. §§ 13, 15.
90. Id. § 16.
91. Id. § 14.
92. Id. § 16.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 13.
95. Cal Stat. 1976, ch. 1399.
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parent or guardian in another state as well as the prosecuting attorney of
that state.9 Upon a proper motion from the other state, the court can
order the petitioner "to appear with the child in a custody proceeding
instituted in the other state . . . . 7 The court may also place the
child in the custody of the court for return to the legal custodian in the
other state. 8 Under these amendments, the institution of new custody
proceedings by an abducting parent will present substantial risks for that
parent and the California courts will have new flexibility in protecting
the abducted child.
Tied in with the concept of convenient forum is an application of
the clean hands doctrine where a petitioner "has wrongfully taken the
child from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct
. Unless required to do so in the interests of the child, custody
jurisdiction shall not be exercised in such cases, and the duty of the
court is to recognize and enforce any prior decree of another state.100
Conclusion
Read together the several sections of the Uniform Act provide a
sophisticated and civilized legal process for the handling of custody
cases. The Uniform Act is not a reciprocal act; hence a state which
passes it is obligated by its terms even though another state concerned
with the matter has not enacted it. But in any event interstate coopera-
tion is required of states which have adopted the new law. Favoritism
for the local contestant over the nonresident should be reduced to a
minimum, and ad hoc custody determinations should be a thing of the
past. No longer will possession of the child be the most important
factor.
We should be realistic, however, in noting the impact of the
proposed law. Other than by way of appeal, there is no escape hatch
where the home state renders a deplorable decision regarding child
custody. The fact that the second forum would have decided the issue
differently is no justification for not enforcing the order of the first
forum. The effects of an erroneous or bad decision thus are insulated
from attack. Of course, this is analogous to the conflict of laws rule of
96. Id. § 5.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 15.
100. Id. For a discussion of the effect on children of parental custody battles see
DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 202-13 (1953).
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Fauntleroy v. Lum, 10' that ordinarily an affront to local public policy or
the fact that a prior decision was erroneous are not excuses for withhold-
ing full faith and credit. Similarly, the fact that the home state deter-
mined child custody on an unacceptable basis or awarded the child to
the wrong party is no justification for entertaining a modification pro-
ceeding under the Uniform Act. This is part of the price to be paid for
bringing order out of chaos in the child custody field. Although an
occasional poor decision may be insulated from challenge, the stability,
continuity, and security of ongoing relationships will be protected.
Of course, national implementation of the act may be difficult due
to the substantial change it effects in custody proceedings. If judges and
lawyers accept the public policy expressed in the act and do not
seek to circumvent it, this unconscionable area of family law will be
rehabilitated. Cases such as the recent Mellon custody controversy
clearly demonstrate the need for abandoning self-help and the substitu-
tion of a rule of law for the social evil of child-snatching.
101. 210 U.S. 230 (1908). Apart from full faith and credit or constitutional man-
date the common law rule is that mistaken findings of fact or applications of law in
the prior proceedings are irrelevant so long as the court had jurisdiction. R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 169 (1968). However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter urged that
strong local policy in exceptional situations may justify withholding recognition of a for-
eign decree. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 426 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
[Editor's Note: Immediately prior to publication of this article, a ninth state adopted
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Arizona. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 25-331 (West
Supp. 1976). See notes 54-61 & accompanying text supa.]
1026 [Vol. 28
